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Abstract We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate
is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. There are two investment alter-
natives: investing in a company (risky asset) and depositing money into a savings account
(risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is possible only for the risky asset. We define a game between
agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payoff by choosing an investment alter-
native and a company management which aims to maximize profits by choosing a bankruptcy
rule. Our agents are differentiated by their incomes. We consider three most prominent bank-
ruptcy rules in our base model: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and
the constrained equal losses rule. We show that only the proportional rule is a part of any
pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in income
distribution in the economy and can be extended to a larger set of bankruptcy rules and mul-
tiple types. However, extension to multiple company framework with competition leads to
equilibria where the noncooperative support for the proportional rule disappears.
Keywords Bankruptcy problems · Constrained equal awards rule ·
Constrained equal losses rule · Noncooperative games · Proportional rule
1 Introduction
As early as 1985, Young argued that incentives of agents should be incorporated into cost-
sharing models. He suggested that the absence of incentives in standard cost-sharing models
makes the analysis of these problems ad hoc. Later, Thomson (2003), in his seminal survey
article, addressed the need to combine noncooperative and market-based approaches and
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to investigate the incentive effects of bankruptcy rules on agents’ behavior in bankruptcy
problems.
Along these lines, we introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of
the estate is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions that also determine their
claims. Our theoretical framework incorporates important economic factors such as income
distribution, stochastic returns on risky investments, and the return on a risk-free outside
option. Our model is motivated by the following facts: (i) In investment situations involving
bankruptcy, agents may act strategically, (ii) bankruptcy may occur following an investment
with stochastic outcomes, (iii) the bankruptcy rule choice and investment decisions may
influence each other through the incentive channel, (iv) the claim distribution may have an
impact on agents’ decisions if there are (positive or negative) externalities, and (v) many real-
life bankruptcy situations involve payments (to shareholders, lenders, partners etc.), which
are not respected by the borrower.
The bankruptcy problem was first introduced formally by O‘Neill (1982). It describes a
situation in which there is a perfectly divisible estate to be allocated to a finite number of
agents, whose claims add up to an amount larger than the estate. Many real life situations such
as distributing a will to inheritants, liquidating the assets of a bankrupt company, rationing,
taxation, and sharing the costs of a public facility can be described using bankruptcy models.
The most prominent bankruptcy rules in the literature are the proportional rule (P), the
constrained equal awards rule (CEA), the constrained equal losses rule (CEL), and the Talmud
rule (T ), which will all be used in our study.1
We know that incentives and strategic behavior play a significant role in real-life bank-
ruptcy problems. Hence, the noncooperative game theoretical approach is a natural and
potentially fruitful one for studying bankruptcy problems. This approach models the bank-
ruptcy problem as a noncooperative game among the claimants and studies equilibria of the
game.2 The major motivation of studies using this approach is that when the authority does
not have a priori preference concerning the rule that will be implemented, he may resort to
implementing a noncooperative game form in which the result of agents’ strategic interactions
determine the rule to be used.
In our model, there are two investment alternatives: investing in a company (risky asset) or
depositing money into a savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is a possible event only
for the risky asset. We define a strategic game between agents each of which aims to maximize
his expected payoff by choosing an investment alternative and a company management which
aims to maximize profits by choosing a bankruptcy rule. This setup is also in line with some
recent suggestions in favor of a more liberal bankruptcy law, which would provide a menu of
rules and allow companies to choose one among them (see Hart 2000). A social planner who
aims to maximize investment in the country by choosing a bankruptcy regime would also fit
into our story. There are two types of agents in our base model, who are differentiated by their
incomes. We consider three prominent bankruptcy rules in our base model: the proportional
rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule.3 In the game,
the company chooses the bankruptcy rule and later all agents simultaneously choose whether
1 For an extensive survey of the axiomatic literature on bankruptcy problems, see Moulin (2002) and Thomson
(2003).
2 There are only a few papers using this approach: O‘Neill (1982), Chun (1989), Dagan et al. (1997), Moreno-
Ternero (2002), Herrero (2003), García-Jurado et al. (2006), Chang and Hu (2008), Atlamaz et al. (2011),
Ashlagi et al. (2012), and Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013).
3 The constrained equal awards rule represents a family of rules favoring smaller claimants, the constrained
equal losses favoring larger claimants and the proportional rule lies in between the two. The constrained equal
awards (losses) rule is regressive (progressive) and the proportional rule is both regressive and progressive.
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to invest in the risky asset (i.e., the project initiated by the company) or the risk-free asset
(savings account in a bank).
Results from our base model provide a strong noncooperative support for the proportional
rule.4 In particular, we show that the proportional rule is a part of any subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. This statement is valid neither for the constrained equal awards rule nor for the
constrained equal losses rule. The direct implication of this result is that the proportional rule
never leads to an investment volume lower than the one under the constrained equal awards
(or losses) rule; and in some cases it leads to an investment in the company strictly higher
than the one under the two rules. Moreover, the result supporting the proportional rule is
independent of the income distribution and holds even under one-sided uncertainty on the
income distribution. We also extend our base model in three dimensions: (i) larger set of
rules, (ii) multiple types of agents, and (iii) two companies competing for funds.
Contributions of our paper can be listed as: (a) endogenizing the choice of a bankruptcy
rule with a noncooperative procedure, (b) endogenizing the value of claims and the estate, (c)
incorporating the well-known bankruptcy model into a context that involves decision-making
under uncertainty and mimics a market environment, and (d) providing a noncooperative
framework in which the bankruptcy rule choice depends on both borrowers’ and lenders
incentives. Firstly, endogenously determined bankruptcy rules, claims, and estates are new
in the literature. In most of the papers on bankruptcy, the analysis is based on exogenously
fixed bankruptcy rules, claims, and estates. In real life, obviously agents’ decisions and hence
their claims and the estate depend on the bankruptcy rule; and the choice of the bankruptcy
rule depends, in turn, on agents’ actions. Secondly, many real life instances that involve
bankruptcy also involve investment decisions under uncertainty. In our paper, we model the
process before the realization of bankruptcy. Incorporation of multiple factors relevant for
behavior in situations that may involve bankruptcy makes our approach different than the
earlier studies with a noncooperative approach, which used somewhat abstract game forms.
Finally, in all bankruptcy papers with noncooperative approaches, the strategic interaction
takes place among claimants, whereas the bankruptcy rule decision is influenced by both
lenders’ and borrower’s interests in our paper. It is determined as a result of a sequential
game played among the lenders and borrowers.
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) is the paper most closely related to ours. These authors also
analyzed the investment implications of different bankruptcy rules. Their results are different
from ours mostly due to the following differences between our modeling assumptions: (i) we
consider standard, constrained versions of equal awards and equal losses rule whereas they
considered unconstrained versions and (ii) the agents in our model are risk-neutral whereas
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) assumed risk aversion.5 As a result, we find that the proportional rule
maximizes the total investment, whereas they found that the equal loss rule maximizes total
investment. Finally, some other differences are: (i) the lender (i.e., company) is a strategic
player choosing a bankruptcy rule in our model whereas Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) compared
equilibrium investment levels under different rules, (ii) we consider some extensions (e.g.,
larger family of rules and competition) whereas they did not, and (iii) they conducted a welfare
4 See Chun (1988), Bergantiños and Sanchez (2002), Gächter and Riedl (2005), Herrero et al. (2010), Ju et al.
(2007), Moreno-Ternero (2002, 2006, 2009), and Cetemen et al. (2014) for results supporting the proportional
rule.
5 Another difference is that in our model agents deposit either zero or all of their endowment whereas in Kıbrıs
and Kıbrıs (2013) intermediate decisions are also allowed. However, this is not a major reason for differences
in results since if we allow agents to optimally choose their deposit amounts, we would have corner solutions
due to our risk-neutrality assumption.
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analysis whereas we do not. We think that these differences in modeling assumptions and
corresponding differences in results make these two papers good complements for readers.
The organization of the paper is as follows: We first introduce the standard bankruptcy
problem and the bankruptcy rules employed in the base model and then provide some prepara-
tory results in Sect. 2.1. In Sect. 2.2, we introduce a strategic model of bankruptcy under
uncertainty and the bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate. In Sect. 3, we analyze
the equilibria of the bankruptcy game introduced in Sect. 2.1. In Sect. 4, we present three
extensions of our model. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 A model of bankruptcy with an endogenous estate
2.1 Bankruptcy problems and rules
Bankruptcy is defined as a situation in which the sum of individual claims exceeds the size
of the available estate. Formally, a bankruptcy problem is represented by a set of claimants
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a claims vector C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) where for all i ∈ N , ci ∈ R++, an
estate E ∈ R++ to be divided among the claimants, and the inequality ∑i∈N ci > E . We
denote the set of all such bankruptcy problems (C, E) by B.
A bankruptcy rule is a mechanism that allocates the estate to claimants given any bank-
ruptcy problem. Formally, a bankruptcy rule, F , is a function mapping each bankruptcy prob-
lem (C, E) ∈ B into Rn+ such that for all i ∈ N , Fi (C, E) ∈ [0, ci ] and
∑
i∈N Fi (C, E) = E .
Below, we define the bankruptcy rules used in our base model.
The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally with respect to claims.
Definition 1 (Proportional Rule) For all (C, E) ∈ B, we have P(C, E) ≡ λpC , where λp
is given by λp = (E/∑i∈N ci ).
The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equal as possible, taking claims
as upper bounds.
Definition 2 (Constrained Equal Awards Rule) For all (C, E) ∈ B, and all j ∈ N , we have
CEA j (C, E) ≡ min{c j , λcea}, where λcea solves ∑i∈N min{ci , λcea} = E .
The constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate as equal as possible,
taking zero as the lower bound.
Definition 3 (Constrained Equal Losses Rule) For all (C, E) ∈ B, and all j ∈ N , we have
CEL j (C, E) ≡ max{0, c j − λcel}, where λcel solves ∑i∈N max{0, ci − λcel} = E .
Loosely speaking, CEA favors small claimants (i.e., it makes transfers from bigger
claimants to smaller claimants) and CEL favors big claimants (i.e., it makes transfers from
smaller claimants to bigger claimants). The following lemma formalizes the idea of inter-
claimant transfers under CEA and CEL, taking P payoffs as a benchmark. Online Appendix
A provides closed forms for transfers and some comparative statics.
Lemma 1 Let (C, E) ∈ B. Assume without loss of generality that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.
Then,
(i) there exists a critical level of claims, c∗, such that for all i ∈ N with ci < c∗,
CEAi (C, E) > Pi (C, E) and for all i ∈ N with ci ≥ c∗, CEAi (C, E) ≤ Pi (C, E)
and,
123
Ann Oper Res (2014) 217:299–318 303
(ii) there exists a critical level of claims, c̃, such that for all i ∈ N with ci < c̃, CELi (C, E) <
Pi (C, E) and for all i ∈ N with ci ≥ c̃ , CELi (C, E) ≥ Pi (C, E).
Proof See online Appendix B. 
Lemma B.1 (see online Appendix B) provides closed form expressions for Fi (C, E) −
Pi (C, E) in the model with two types of agents.
2.2 The model
There are nh agents each with income wh and nl agents each with income wl , such that
0 < wl < wh .6 Accordingly, Nh is the set of type h agents with |Nh | = nh and Nl is the set
of type l agents with |Nl | = nl . We use t to refer to a generic type i.e., t ∈ {l, h}. Therefore,
for all agents i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh , the individual income wi ∈ {wl , wh}. Both types of agents are
risk-neutral. Hence, each agent wants to choose the investment alternative that brings the
maximum expected return. There are two investment alternatives: agents either invest in a
company and become shareholders or deposit their money into a savings account in a bank.
The company runs a risky investment project. Depositing money into a bank, on the
other hand, brings a risk-free return. The state space for the outcome of the risky investment
project is  = {s, f }, where s represents success and f represents failure. Hence, the
outcome of the project is a random variable ω. With probability Pr(ω = s) = πs < 1, the
investment project is successful and brings a payoff of rs (0 < rs ≤ 1) to the company;
with probability Pr(ω = f ) = 1 − πs , the investment project fails and brings a payoff of r f
(r f < rs ≤ 1) to the company. The company promises to pay r to depositors, which satisfies
0 ≤ r f < r ≤ rs ≤ 1. However, if the project fails the company cannot honor all claims
since r f < r .
On the other hand, the savings account at the bank pays a constant, risk-free return r . We
eliminate two cases that would lead to trivial results: r f > r and r > r . If r f > r was the
case, then no agent would prefer to deposit their money to the bank and if r > r was the case,
then no agent would prefer to invest in the company. To make the problem interesting, we
assume that r f < r < r . Thus, the risky asset offers a higher return in the case of success,
but a lower return in the case of failure. Having introduced the necessary parameters, now
we define the particular class of bankruptcy problems we analyze.
Definition 4 A bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate is a pair (C, E), where C is
a claims vector with entries ci = (1 + r)wi for all i ∈ N and E = (1 + r f )∑i∈N wi is the
estate. The class of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate is denoted by B̃.
The endogeneity is due to the fact that the claims vector and the estate are determined by
agents’ decisions. Moreover, note that C and E in the definition of the bankruptcy problem are
derived fromw, r f , and r . Hence, the data of the problem can be written as (w, r f , r) instead
of (C, E). However, to keep the exposition similar to the standard one used in the literature,
we use (C, E) notation. All these parameters are common knowledge among players.
The company, denoted as m, chooses a bankruptcy rule F . The company’s objective is to
maximize its profit. Note that, given r , rs , r f , r , and πs , maximizing the profit is equivalent to
maximizing the investment attracted. The bankruptcy rule chosen affects agents’ investment
decisions since it affects their returns in case of a bankruptcy. Hence, the company takes into
account the possible actions of agents while choosing the bankruptcy rule. We use P , CEA, and
6 In fact, what we mean by wl (wh ) is the part of the income that is reserved for investment by a type l (h)
agent.
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CEL in our base model. Accordingly, the company’s strategy space isψm = {P,CEA,CEL}.
The company’s decision is observed by all agents. Hence, each decision of the company starts
a proper subgame to be played by agents. We denote these three subgames by P , CEA, and
CEL .
Knowing the bankruptcy rule, F , chosen by m, all agents i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh simultaneously
choose whether to invest their money in the risky asset (i.e., playing in) or to invest in
the risk-free asset (i.e., playing out). For all i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh , we denote agent i’s actions by
ai ∈ {in, out} and the actions taken by agent i under rule F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL} as ai,F . We
describe what each agent i would do in each subgame F by agent i’s strategy, which is
denoted by si ∈ ψi . Agent i’s strategy space, ψi , can be written as
ψi = {(ai,P , ai,C E A, ai,C E L ) | ai,F ∈ {in, out} and F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL}}. (1)
The company’s payoff function is denoted as Vm(F) = ∑t∈{l,h} nt,in(F)wt , where nt,in(F)
stands for the number of type t agents who play in in the subgame F . Therefore, we can
write the company’s objective to maximize the investment it attracts as
max
F∈{P,CEA,CEL}Vm(F). (2)
Note that once r and r f are fixed, E and C are both determined by agents’ actions. When
writing agents’ payoffs under bankruptcy, we employ the notation, Vi,in(F, nh,in, nl,in) since
agent i’s payoff in case of bankruptcy is determined by F , nh,in ,and nl,in . Similarly, agent
i’s transfer under rule F can be written as Si (F, nh,in, nl,in).
Now, given agent i’s action in F , the payoff of agent i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh can be written as




Vi,out =(1+r)wi , if ai,F = out
V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in)=πs(1+r)wi +(1 − πs)[Vi,in(P, nh,in, nl,in)
+ Si (F, nh,in, nl,in)], if ai,F = in
(3)
where the superscript e refers to the expected value. Notice that the first part of
V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in) is agent i’s payoff in case of successful completion of the project and
the second part is his payoff in case of a bankruptcy. Also note that for all i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh,
Si (P, nh,in, nl,in) = 0 under P .
The following lemma enables us to simplify the notation Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in), since it
shows that the payoff of each agent under P is independent from other agents’ types, actions,
etc. Consequently, we can write agent j’s payoff under P as Pj .
Lemma 2 Assume that for all j ∈ Nl ∪ Nh, the claim structure is c j = (1 + r)w j and the
estate is E = (1 + r f )∑i∈Nl∪Nh wi . Then Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) ≡ Pj = (1 + r f )w j .
Proof See online Appendix B. 
This result is valid for any finite number of types. By Lemma 2, if agent i is of type t ,
then Vi,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) = (1 + r f )wt . We rewrite agent i’s expected payoff under P as
Pei = πs(1 + r)wi + (1 − πs)Pi . (4)
Using the expected payoff under P , we can rewrite agent i’s expected payoff under CEA as
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = πs(1 + r)wi + (1 − πs)[Pi + Si (CEA, nh,in, nl,in)]
= Pei + (1 − πs)Si (CEA, nh,in, nl,in), (5)
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Payoffs (Vm (F), (Vi,si (F, s−i )), i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh
where Pei stands for the expected payoff that agent i would get under P and Si (CEA, nh,in,
nl,in) is the transfer that agent i makes/receives under CEA, when nh,in type h agents and
nl,in type l agents play in. Similarly, under CEL, agent i’s expected payoff can be rewritten
as
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = πs(1 + r)wi + (1 − πs)[Pi + Si (CEL, nh,in, nl,in)]
= Pei + (1 − πs)Si (CEL, nh,in, nl,in), (6)
where Si (CEL, nh,in, nl,in) is the transfer that agent i makes/receives under CEL, when nh,in
type h agents and nl,in type l agents play in.
Table 1 and the sequence of actions described before define the sequential game  with
three proper subgamesP , C E A, andC E L , where s−i denotes all agents’ strategies except
agent i . We look for pure strategy equilibria of this game. The equilibrium concept we employ
is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Analysis of equilibrium decisions
We analyze the equilibria of the game defined in Table 1. We first analyze the subgamesF ∈
{P , C E A, C E L } played among all agents i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh . Therefore, in the following, when
we use the term equilibrium, it refers to the agents’ equilibrium actions in the corresponding
subgame. After analyzing agents’ behavior in each subgame, we analyze the company’s action
in equilibrium. This is followed by the description of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
the game along with the resulting investment in the company.
3.1 Some preparatory results
Before the analysis of agents’ equilibrium investment decisions, we prove some preparatory
lemmas and corollaries. Corollary B.1 (see online Appendix B) provides closed form expres-
sions for c∗ and c̃ in B̃ and Corollary B.2 (see online Appendix B) derives closed form transfers
under CEA and CEL. The following lemma shows that c∗ and c̃ are always between cl and ch .
Lemma 3 Let (C, E) ∈ B̃. Assume that nh,in > 0 and nl,in > 0. Then, for all nh,in and
nl,in , (i) cl ≤ c∗ ≤ ch and (ii) cl ≤ c̃ ≤ ch.
Proof See online Appendix B. 
Since if one type is making transfers the other type should be receiving transfers in the
case with two types, the result mentioned in Lemma 3 is trivial. This result is required
for the comparative static analyses we conduct in Lemma B.2 (see online Appendix B). It
ensures that when the number of type t ∈ {l, h} agents changes, the identity of the types (i.e,
transfer-maker or transfer-receiver) stays the same.
Lemma B.2 provided in online Appendix B presents comparative statics with simple intu-
itions. It analyzes the changes in per-capita transfer with respect to changes in the number
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of type h and type l agents. We see that if the number of agents of types who are making
transfers increases, per-capita transfers they make decrease and per-capita transfers other
types receive increase. On the other hand, if the number of agents of types who are receiving
transfers increases, per-capita transfers they receive decrease per-capita transfers other types
make increase.
Tie-Breaking Assumption Every agent plays “in” when he is indifferent between “in” and
“out”.
This tie-breaking assumption is employed in the rest of the paper. The following lemma
states that each agent’s decision in equilibrium is determined by his type only.
Lemma 4 (Symmetry) If agents i and j are of the same type t ∈ {l, h}, their strategies are
the same in equilibrium.
Proof See online Appendix B. 
Lemma 4 has three important implications. First of all, it shows that if there exists an
equilibrium it will be symmetric, i.e., same types play the same strategy in equilibrium. The
tie-breaking assumption is important for the validity of Lemma 4. If agents of the same
type play strategies that are different from each other when these agents are indifferent, the
statement in Lemma 4 is not valid anymore. However, breaking the ties in favor of playing in
is not crucial for the proofs. Assuming that every agent plays out when he is indifferent would
work equally well. We stick to one of these (i.e., playing in) since extending the analysis
by allowing both possibilities does not bring any additional insights. Second, this symmetry
result enables us to employ a more compact notation for equilibrium actions in subgames
F (in game ): (ah,F , al,F )means that all type h agents play ah,F and all type l agents play
al,F in F . Third, this result also enables us to use a simpler notation when writing agents’
expected payoffs. Since we know that agents of the same type act identically, we can write
the expected payoff of a representative type t agent who plays in under F as V et (F, s−t )
instead of writing individual expected payoff as V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in). We will employ this
notation in the remainder of the analysis.
The following corollary relates the symmetry result to equilibrium values of Vm(F): since
we show that agents of the same type play the same strategies in equilibrium, this reduces
the number of possible values the equilibrium investment volume can take.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, Vm(F) can take four values: 0, nhwh, nlwl and nhwh + nlwl .
Proof See online Appendix B. 
The following lemma shows that certain strategy profiles cannot be a part of any equilib-
rium under CEA and CEL.
Lemma 5 The following statements about strategy profiles are valid.
(i) In C E A, the strategy profile (for all i ∈ Nh, si = (., in, .) and for all j ∈ Nl , s j =
(., out, .)) cannot be an equilibrium,
(ii) In C E L , the strategy profile (for all i ∈ Nh, si = (., ., out) and for all j ∈ Nl ,
s j = (., ., in)) cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof See online Appendix B. 
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Table 2 Payoff matrix under P h \ l in out





out Vh,out , P
e
l Vh,out , Vl,out
The result in this lemma has a simple intuition: if, in equilibrium, the parameter values
are such that even the type of agents who are making (receiving) transfers find playing in
(out) optimal, the type of agents who are receiving (making) transfers also find it optimal to
play in (out).
3.2 Characterization of all nash equilibria in subgames
In this subsection, we describe agents’ investment behavior and characterize all Nash equi-
libria in P , C E A, and C E L . Recall that Lemma 4 enables us to use type best responses
instead of agent best responses. Hence, in this section, we use type t’s best response to a
strategy played by the other type. We denote the best response of type t agents to action a−t
played by the other type of agents in the subgame F by B Rt (F, a−t ).7
Proposition 1 Equilibria in P can be described as follows:
(i) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet < Vt,out , then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is
(ah,P , al,P ) = (out, out).
(ii) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet ≥ Vt,out , then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is
(ah,P , al,P ) = (in, in).
Proof In P , the payoff matrix given in Table 2 can be used to show representative type h
and type l agent’s expected payoffs. The first (second) item in each cell represents each type
h (type l) agent’s expected payoff.
Recall that by Lemma 2, the expected payoff of each agent is independent of other agents’
strategies under P . This implies that all equilibria are dominant strategy equilibria. Also, note
that by Lemma B.3 (see online Appendix B), Pel < Vl,out if and only if P
e
h < Vh,out . There-
fore, if Peh ≥ Vh,out , then B Rh(P, in) = B Rh(P, out) = in, and similarly if Pel ≥ Vl,out ,
then B Rl(P, in) = B Rl(P, out) = in. If Peh < Vh,out , then B Rh(P, in) = B Rh(P, out) =
out , and similarly if Pel < Vl,out , then B Rl(P, in) = B Rl(P, out) = out . 
Note that neither (in, out) nor (out, in) equilibria are possible in P . This is due to
proportionality, which implies that Peh ≥ Vh,out if and only if Pel ≥ Vl,out .
Proposition 2 Equilibria in C E A can be described as follows:
(i) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet < Vt,out , then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is
(ah,C E A, al,C E A) = (out, out).
(ii) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet ≥ Vt,out and V eh (CEA, in) = Peh +(1−πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out ,
then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is (ah,CEA, al,C E A) = (out, in).
(iii) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet ≥ Vt,out and V eh (CEA, in) = Peh +(1−πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out ,
then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is (ah,C E A, al,C E A) = (in, in).
7 Also note that each agent has one information set in each subgame and two actions. Therefore, the terms
strategy and action refer to same objects in subgames P , C E A , and C E L .
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Table 3 Payoff matrix under CEA
h \ l in out
in Peh + (1 − πs )Sh(C E A, in), Pel + (1 − πs )Sl (C E A, in) Peh , Vl,out
out Vh,out , P
e
l Vh,out , Vl,out
Proof In C E A, the payoff matrix given in Table 3 can be used.
By the definition of CEA and Lemma 1, Sh(CEA, in) < 0 and Sl(CEA, in) > 0. If
the risk-free asset pays more than the best possible expected payoff that type l agents can
get, the analysis is trivial since type l agents would never play in. Hence, we assume
that V el (CEA, in) = Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEA, in) > Vl,out . This assumption implies that
B Rl(CEA, in) = in. The relationship between Pel and Vl,out determines type l agents’
best response to type h agents playing out . If Pel ≥ Vl,out , then B Rl(CEA, out) = in; if
Pel < Vl,out , then B Rl(CEA, out) = out . On the other hand, type h’s best response against
in depends on the relationship between V eh (CEA, in) = Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) and
Vh,out . If
V eh (C E A, in) = Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(C E A, in) ≥ Vh,out ,
then B Rh(C E A, in) = in; if
V eh (C E A, in) = Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(C E A, in) < Vh,out ,
then B Rh(C E A, in) = out . Therefore, these inequalities characterize agents’ equilibrium
behavior in C E A. 
Proposition 3 Equilibria in C E L can be described as follows:
(i) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet < Vt,out , then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is
(ah,C E L , al,C E L) = (out, out).
(ii) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet ≥ Vt,out and V el (CEL, in) = Pel +(1−πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out ,
then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is (ah,C E L , al,C E L) = (in, out).
(iii) If for all t ∈ {l, h}, Pet ≥ Vt,out and V el (CEL, in) = Pel +(1−πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out ,
then the unique equilibrium strategy profile is (ah,C E L , al,C E L) = (in, in).
Proof In C E L , the payoff matrix given in Table 4 can be used.
By the definition of CEL and Lemma 1, Sh(CEL, in) > 0 and Sl(CEL, in) < 0. If
the outside asset pays more than the best possible expected payoff that type h agents can
get, the analysis is trivial since then type h agents would never play in. Hence, we assume
that V eh (CEL, in) = Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEL, in) > Vh,out . This assumption implies that
B Rh(CEL, in) = in. The relationship between Peh and Vh,out determines type h agents’ best
response to type l agents playing out . If Peh ≥ Vh , then B Rh(CEL, out) = in ; if Ph < Vh,out ,
then B Rh(CEL, out) = out . On the other hand, type l’s best response to type h agents play-
ing in depends on the relationship between V el (CEL, in) = Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) and
Table 4 Payoff matrix under CEL
h \ l in out
in Peh + (1 − πs )Sh(CEL, in), Pel + (1 − πs )Sl (CEL, in) Peh , Vl,out
out Vh,out , P
e
l Vh,out , Vl,out
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Vl,out . If
V el (CEL, in) = Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out ,
then B Rl(CEL, in) = in; if
V el (CEL, in) = Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out ,
then B Rl(CEL, in) = out . Therefore, these inequalities characterize agents’ equilibrium
actions in C E L . 
Note that in a Nash equilibrium of C E A, if type h agents play in, type l agents
also play in. Similarly, in a Nash equilibrium of C E L , if type l agents play in, type
h agents also play in . Also note that, if the equilibrium of P is the strategy profile
(ah,P , al,P ) = (out, out), then the equilibrium strategy profiles of C E A and C E L are
also (ah,C E A, al,C E A) = (ah,C E L , al,C E L) = (out, out).
3.3 Characterization of all subgame perfect nash equilibria
In this subsection, we analyze the company’s behavior and characterize all subgame perfect
Nash equilibria in . As we mentioned in Sect. 2, the company’s payoff function is Vm(F)
= ∑t∈{l,h} nt,in(F)wt , where nt,in(F) is the number of type t agents played in under F .
Therefore, the company’s decision depends on the equilibrium strategies of agents in each
subgame. In the previous subsection, we analyzed the equilibrium strategies of agents in all
three subgames. Below, we list different combinations of inequalities and the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium strategy profiles along with the equilibrium investment in the company. In
the strategy profile (sm, sh, sl), the first entry refers to the company’s strategy (i.e., sm ∈ ψm)
, second to type h agents’ (i.e., sh ∈ ψh), and third to type l agents’ (i.e., sl ∈ ψl ). Moreover,
the first entry in a representative type t agent’s strategy profile refers to his equilibrium action
in P , the second to his equilibrium action in C E A, and the third to his equilibrium action
in C E L .
C1. If for all t ∈ {l, h}
Pet ≥ Vt,out ,
Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out , and
Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out ,
then given agents’ equilibrium actions inP ,C E A, andC E L presented in the previous
subsection, the company prefers P and the equilibrium investment in the company
is Vm(F) = ∑t∈{l,h} ntwt . As we showed in the previous subsection, under these
parameter restrictions, neither CEA nor CEL can attract all types to invest in the company,
whereas P can. Hence, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile is
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; out; in), (in; in; out)).
C2. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
Pet ≥ Vt,out ,
Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out , and
Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(C E L , in) < Vl,out ,
then given agents’ equilibrium actions in P , C E A, and C E L , the company prefers
P or CEA to CEL and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F) =
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∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt . Both CEA and P can attract all types to invest in the company whereas
the CEL can only attract h types. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; in; in), (in; in; out)) and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (in; in; in), (in; in; out)).
C3. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
Pet ≥ Vt,out ,
Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out , and
Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out ,
then given agents’ equilibrium actions in P , C E A, and C E L , the company prefers
P or CEL to CEA and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F) =∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt . Both CEL and P can attract all types to invest in the company whereas
CEA can only attract l types. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; out; in), (in; in; in)) and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (in; out; in), (in; in; in)).
C4. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
Pet ≥ Vt,out ,
Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out , and
Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out ,
then given agents’ equilibrium actions in P , C E A, and C E L , the company is
indifferent between all three rules, and the equilibrium investment in the company is
Vm(F) = ∑t∈{l,h} ntwt . All rules are equally able to attract all types to invest in the
company. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profiles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)),
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)), and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)).
C5. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
Pet < Vt,out ,
then given agents’ equilibrium actions inP ,C E A, andC E L , the company is indiffer-
ent between all three rules, and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F) = 0.
Since Pet ≥ Vt,out is a necessary condition for both types of agents’ equilibrium deci-
sions to be in, none of the rules can attract neither of the two types to invest in the
company. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profiles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)),
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)), and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)).
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Note that in C4 and C5, the company’s decision does not really matter. Basically, anything
goes in these cases. As we have shown above, besides Pet ≥ Vt,out ,
Peh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out and
Pel + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out
should be satisfied in C4. The interpretation of this is that neither under CEA nor under
CEL, per-capita transfers from disadvantaged type of agents to advantaged type of agents
are significantly high. This, intuitively, can be due to (i) a small difference between wl and
wh , (ii) a low probability of bankruptcy (i.e., 1 − πs), or (iii) a small outside asset payoff
(r ). C5 shows another situation in which the decision will not make a difference. No matter
which rule the company chooses, the investment in the company will be 0. However, this
has nothing to do with the income distribution in the society. We show in Lemma B.3 (see
online Appendix B) that Pet ≥ Vt,out does not contain any income distribution parameters
(e.g., nl , nh, wl andwh). Hence, the validity of this condition depends only on the risk-return
characteristics of investment alternatives. Intuitively, if the payoff from the risk-free asset is
sufficiently high, or the probability of bankruptcy is sufficiently high (or more generally the
expected return from the risky investment is sufficiently low) then Pet < Vt,out will hold.
3.4 Equilibrium and results
In this subsection, we present some results which are implied by the analyses of equilibria
conducted in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3. First of all, in the light of the analyses carried out in the
previous section it is easy to see that a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of 
exists. Below, we present our main result of the base model.
Theorem 1 For any bankruptcy problem (C, E) ∈ B̃, only P is a part of any subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of .
Proof Notice that in each of five cases analyzed in Sect. 3.3, P appears in subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Since, we characterized all equilibria in Sect. 3.3, the result immediately
follows. Note that in C3, CEA is not a part of the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria; in C2,
CEL is not a part of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria and in C1, neither of these rules
belong to the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria. Hence, the statement in the theorem is valid
only for P . 
In Corollary B.3 (see online Appendix B), we show that our main result is robust with
respect to changes in the income distribution.
Remark 1 By Corollary B.3, even if there is an uncertainty about the income distribution
(i.e., the company does not know the income distribution for sure) the statement in Theorem
1 is still valid. In fact, for probability distributions that assign non-zero probability to all
possible income distributions, P would be the unique optimal strategy for an expected-profit
maximizing company.
Remark 2 For certain real-life circumstances, one may suggest that an increase in the invest-
ment volume can lead to an increase in the return rate (e.g., the investment project involves
increasing returns to capital) and/or a decrease in the rate of risk (e.g., a higher level of capital
increases the likelihood of success). If we incorporate such possibilities, we expect that our
results may quantitatively change. The relative (with respect to P) positions of CEA and CEL
would improve. However, we still expect P to outperform other rules.
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Remark 3 For certain real-life circumstances, one may suggest that investors move sequen-
tially rather than simultaneously. The result in Theorem 1 would still be valid even if agents’
investment decisions are sequential instead of simultaneous. It follows from the fact that
sequencing (independent of which type of agents moves first) cannot increase the equilib-
rium investment volume under CEA or CEL; and it does not have any effect on the investment
volume under P .
4 Extensions
4.1 Extension to a larger set of rules
In this subsection, we show that our results remain valid if we enlarge the set of rules we use
in our model. Our first candidate is the Talmud rule (T AL) (see Aumann and Maschler 1985).
Like the ones we used in our base model, the Talmud rule is also a prominent bankruptcy
rule satisfying a large set of desirable properties (see Herrero and Villar 2001 and Thomson
2003).
Definition 5 (Talmud Rule) For all (C, E) ∈ B̃, and all j ∈ N ,
T AL j (C, E) ≡
{












i∈N T ALi (C, E) = E .
Proposition 4 Denote the extended game for which F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL, T AL} by ̂ and
let (E,C) ∈ B̃,
(i) P is the only rule that is always a part of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of ̂,
when E 
= ∑i∈N ci2 and
(ii) P and T AL are the only rules that are always parts of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of ̂, when E = ∑i∈N ci2 (i.e., r = 1 and r f = 0).
Proof See online Appendix B. 
Note that instead of adding T AL to {P,CEA,CEL}, if we replaced P with T AL , then
T AL would outperform CEA and CEL in attracting investment into the company. More
generally, we conjecture that if we replace P with any other order-preserving rule F in
between CEA and CEL (in the regressivity–progressivity spectrum), F will outperform CEA
and CEL in attracting investment. Nevertheless, as soon as P is added back to {F,CEA,CEL},
P will again outperform others.
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) generalized the Talmud rule by introducing the TAL-
family of rules, which contains the Talmud, constrained equal awards and the constrained
equal losses rules as special cases.
Definition 6 (TAL-family) The TAL-family consists of all rules of the following form: For
some θ ∈ [0, 1], for all (E,C) ∈ B̃ and for all i ∈ N ,
Fθi (C, E) =
{
min{θci , λ} if E ≤ ∑i∈N θci
max{θci , ci − μ} if E ≥ ∑i∈N θci
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where μ and λ solve
∑
i∈N Fθi (C, E) = E .8
For the extended game including all members of the TAL-family along with P in the
strategy space of the company, we can argue—along the same lines as the proof of Proposition
4—that for any bankruptcy problem (E,C) ∈ B̃, there always exists a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of ̃ with P and the member of the TAL-family parametrized by θ∗ = 1+r f1+r .
Given r and r f , E∑
i∈N ci
= 1+r f1+r ∈ [ 12 , 1). Therefore, a result similar to the one in Proposition
4 would follow. We leave the extension to a larger set of rules as an open question for future
work.
4.2 Extension to multiple types
In this subsection, we show that our main result extends to a model with more than two
types of agents. We do not present a full characterization of all subgame perfect equilibria as
we did in previous sections. Instead, using some of the results from the analyses we earlier
conducted, we present a short proof showing that the result in Theorem 1 holds true in a
model with multiple types of agents.
Proposition 5 For any (C, E) ∈ B̃ with more than two types of agents, P is a part of any
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of  and it is the only one to do so among P, CEA, and
CEL.
Proof First of all, observe from Lemma B.3 (see online Appendix B) that Pet ≥ Vt,out does
not contain any income distribution parameters. Thus, the conditions under which P attracts
all types into company remain the same. This implies that P is still a part of any subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of , in a game with multiple types of agents (see the analysis in
Sect. 3.3). To show that it is the only rule among the three to do so, finding a case where P
still attracts all types but neither CEA nor CEL can do so is sufficient. To do this, take the
case where Pet = Vt,out . Under this condition, P still attracts all types in to investment in the
company. However, if CEA (or CEL) is used, the company cannot attract all types since if
one type of agents is receiving transfers, then some others should be making transfers, which
implies that transfer-making agents receive a payoff less than Pet . But since P
e
t = Vt,out , this
implies that transfer-making type of agents receive an expected payoff less than the risk-free
return. Therefore, they do not invest in the company. Finally, when Pet < Vt,out , still none
of the rules can attract any investment. Hence, the result follows. 
4.3 Competition for investment
So far we assume a single company in our analysis. However, in many cases there are more
than one company competing for the same group of investors in real life. In this subsection,
we introduce a competition between two companies. Below, we first set up the model with
two companies and then present our results.
In this subsection, we assume that there are two companies (m and m) competing for the
same set of potential investors in Nl ∪ Nh . We model the competition between these two
companies à la Stackelberg. Accordingly, m is the first-mover and m is the second-mover.
Risk-return characteristics (πs , r , and r f ) are assumed to be identical for both companies
8 Note that F = CEL for θ = 0, F = CEA for θ = 1, and F = T for θ = 1/2. Moreover, for all θ ∈ [0, 1],
Fθ coincides with CEA (on adjusted θ -claims) if E ≤ ∑i∈N θci and CEL (on adjusted (1 − θ) -claims) if
E ≥ ∑i∈N θci . Finally, note that P is not a member of the TAL-family.
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and there is, again, a single risk-free asset (with return r ) available for agents. As in our base
model, each company chooses a bankruptcy rule out of three (P , CEA, and CEL) rules to
maximize its investment volume. However, now m moves first and chooses a bankruptcy rule
and then m, observing m’s action, moves and also chooses a bankruptcy rule. Accordingly,
m’s strategy space is denoted by ψm = {P,CEA,CEL} and m’s strategy space is denoted
by ψm = { (P, P), (CEA, P), (CEL, P), (P,CEA), (CEA,CEA), (CEL,CEA), (P,CEL),
(CEA,CEL), (CEL,CEL) } where first entries refer to m’s actions and second entries refer
to m’s actions. Each action couple (consisting of actions of both companies) starts a subgame
to be played by agents. We denote the subgame started by m playing Fm and m playing Fm
by Fm ,Fm . After observing companies’ actions, agents simultaneously choose whether to
invest in one of the companies or in the risk-free outside asset. Since there are two companies
now, agents i’s action set is ai = (m,m, out). For all i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh , we denote the actions
taken by agent i in subgame Fm ,Fm as ai,Fm Fm . We describe what each agent i does in each
subgame Fm ,Fm by agent i’s strategy, which is again denoted by si ∈ ψi . Agent i’s strategy
space, ψi , can be written as
ψi = {(ai,Fm Fm ) | Fm, Fm ∈ {P,CEA,CEL} and ai,Fm ,Fm ∈ {m,m, out}}. (7)
We denote m’s payoff function as Vm(Fm, Fm) = ∑t∈{l,h} nt,m(Fm, Fm)wt , where nt,m
stands for the number of type t agents who invest in m in the subgame Fm ,Fm and m’s payoff
function as Vm(Fm, Fm) = ∑t∈{l,h} nt,m(Fm, Fm)wt , where nt,m stands for the number of
type t agents who invest in m in the subgame Fm ,Fm . Therefore, we can write the objective




We, again, focus on pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. The only
difference is we add the following refinement assumptions:
Assumption 1 Each agent plays his weakly dominant strategy in case there is one.
Assumption 2 When a certain type of agents are indifferent between two companies, half
of them invest in m and the other half in m.9
Table 5 defines the sequential game , where s−i denotes all agents’ strategies except
agent i .
Below, we list our main findings. Formal proofs for these results can be found in online
Appendix C where we characterize all Nash equilibria in each subgame and all subgame
perfect Nash equilbria of the extended model. In the following, we denote the total amount
of money held by type l (h) agents as Wl (Wh).
(i) The income distribution is very influential on companies’ decisions and hence the bank-
ruptcy rules chosen in equilibrium. In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (except the
ones that involve all two-combinations of three rules), m, i.e., the first-mover, chooses
a bankruptcy rule favoring type of agents with a larger Wt .
(ii) In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (except the ones that involve all two-combinations
of three rules), m, i.e., the second-mover, follows the first-mover by choosing the same
bankruptcy rule when Wh ≥ 2Wl (or Wl ≥ 2Wl ). On the other hand, when 2Wl ≥
Wh ≥ Wl (or 2Wh ≥ Wl ≥ Wh), the first-mover and the second-mover choose different
9 For this assumption, we further need to assume that there are even number of agents of each type.
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Table 5 Sequential game 
Players {m,m} ∪ Nl ∪ Nh




Payoffs (Vm (Fm , Fm ), Vm (Fm , Fm )(Vi,si (Fm , Fm , s−i )), i ∈ Nl ∪ Nh
bankruptcy rules in which case the first-mover has an advantage in terms of the amount
of investment.
(iii) Under some circumstances (e.g., Wh ≥ 2Wl or Wl ≥ 2Wl ), the competition between
two companies leads to a smaller amount of total investment compared to the single-
company case. In such circumstances, m follows m by choosing the same rule that favors
a certain type of agents. The other type of agents do not invest in a company leading to
a lower total investment compared to the investment volume in the one-company case.
(iv) The type of agents with a larger Wt cannot obtain a payoff advantage over the other
type of agents, even though the first-mover chooses a bankruptcy rule that favors them
in all generic cases. When 2Wl ≥ Wh ≥ Wl (or 2Wh ≥ Wl ≥ Wh), companies
choose different bankruptcy rules and each type of agent invests in the company whose
bankruptcy rule favors his type (if they invest in a company at all). Hence, there are no
transfers between two types of agents. When Wh ≥ 2Wl (or Wl ≥ 2Wl ), both companies
choose the same bankruptcy rule (the one that favors the type of agents with a larger Wt )
and only the type of agents who are favored by this rule invest in companies. Hence,
again, there are no transfers between two types of agents.
Our results in this subsection show that incorporating the competition for funds between
borrowers (companies) has a critical influence on bankruptcy rules chosen in equilibrium.
Interestingly, we do not find any noncooperative support for the proportional rule here. In fact,
the results imply that the use of the proportional rule in the one-company case can attract more
investment compared to the two-company case, which involves other rules (see iii above).
Similarly, if a central authority implements the proportional rule in the two-company case,
this can attract more investment to these two companies than a liberal regime that allows
companies to choose their bankruptcy rules strategically (as modeled above).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems, which has an empirical
and a strategic appeal. In these bankruptcy problems, the value of the estate to be allocated
is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. This is what we observe in
many real life situations. For instance, the amount to be allocated by a firm to its sharehold-
ers/stockholders may depend on the initial amount of money borrowed from them. Similarly,
a bank offers a return rate on deposits. Moreover, in line with some recent suggestions in
favor of a more liberal bankruptcy law, which provides a menu of bankruptcy procedures and
allows companies to select among them (see Hart 2000), we allow the company in our base
model to choose from a menu of bankruptcy rules that consists of three most well-known
rules. The company’s objective in choosing a bankruptcy rule is to maximize its profits.
Agents, in an attempt to maximize their expected payoffs, observe the choice made by the
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company and decide whether to lend money to the company (risky investment) or deposit
their money in a savings account (risk-free investment).
Our results from the base model show that the proportional rule receives a strong support
in this strategic setting: the proportional rule is the only rule among the three that is always a
part of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. A direct implication is that there is no equilibrium
in which the proportional rule leads to a lower investment volume than the other rules.
This result is independent of the income distribution in the economy and holds even under
one-sided uncertainty on income distribution (i.e., the company does not know the income
distribution perfectly). In fact, for probability distributions that assign non-zero probability to
all possible income distributions, the proportional rule would be the unique optimal strategy
for an expected profit maximizing company. We also extend our base model to a setup that
includes a larger set of bankruptcy rules (e.g., Talmud rule or TAL-family), more than two
types of agents, and competition between two firms for investment funds. Interestingly, the
results of the extended model with competition do not lend much strategic support to the
proportional rule.
Our results provide (i) another potential reason for the centrality of the proportional
rule in the bankruptcy literature and (ii) a possible, interesting context (i.e., competition
between firms) where this support fails to prevail. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper which models the bankruptcy rule determination as a sequential game between
lenders (agents) and borrowers (companies). It is also the first paper, which embeds the
classical bankruptcy problem in a decision-making under uncertainty environment and uses
bankruptcy rules as a tool for competition in attracting investors.
We should emphasize here that we introduce a model where incentives, strategic interac-
tion, and uncertainty are incorporated in to a bankruptcy framework. We do not claim that
this is the only way to do it. For instance, we just think that a stochastic return on investment
is a natural assumption. There are surely other possible ways to introduce uncertainty. One
such modeling alternative would be making claims stochastic.10 Ertemel and Kumar (2013)
characterize ex-ante and ex-post proportional rules in such a setting. There may also be alter-
native game forms that can be used in incorporating incentives and strategic interaction. We
firmly believe that future research on bankruptcy games will explore some of these alternative
ways and arrive at better models. In that respect, this study should be considered as one of
the first attempts along these lines.
Another point worth mentioning is the proportional return structure embedded in our
model. That is, the company promises a percentage return to investors, which leads to a
proportional relationship between the endogenous estate and the aggregate claim. This type
of a return structure is very common in many real life circumstances. That is why we made
this assumption. On the other hand, this assumption can be seen as a factor leading towards the
support found for the proportional rule in the base model. Nevertheless, the same assumption
is made in the extended model with competition as well, where we did not find support for
the proportional rule. We believe that investigating the effects of alternative—may be more
sophisticated, state-contingent—return structures on equilibrium behavior is a worthy goal,
left for future work.
Finally, we believe that our framework can be developed in many other dimensions. In
particular, future work on the topic may endogenize market forces that govern interest rates
and incorporate network structures that are present in markets for funds.
10 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
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